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ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN A WAR ZONE: SADCC's
Struggle for Economic Liberation Enters Its Sixth Year
We have built an organisation from our own realities and 
experience and not from patterns imported from abroad.
President Samora Machel,
SADCC Summit, Gaborone, 1984
It would appear that over the past 20 years or so, economic 
co-operation could have moved faster, with fewer failures if 
those responsible for organising co-operation were not always 
led by traditional models [which] did not always take into 
account regional and subregional realities.
Governor Philip Ndegwa, Central 
Bank of Kenya, Journal of 
Development Planning, 1985
The present study is... to consider the kinds of leverage that 
regional economic interaction offers South Africa... to examine 
ways in which the Republic could use its economic relationships 
in Southern Africa for non-economic purposes...
Professor Deon Geldenhuys 
Consultancy Paper for South African 
Government, 19 81
SADCC has repeatedly called on the international community to 
use its influence to deter and halt South African aggression 
and destabilisation against its neighbours... calls for 
effective international action against apartheid... several 
states individually or collectively have instituted limited 
economic sanctions against South Africa. SADCC member States 
encourage these initiatives and urge that more effective 
measures be implemented.
SADCC, Overview volume 
Harare Annual Conference, 1986
This [provision of military support to UNITA] now places the 
United States clearly in league with South Africa in aggressing 
and fomenting instability in this region.
SADCC Conference Chairman,
Vice President Peter Mmusi of 
Botswana, Harare, 1986
SADCC: A Lutta Continua
SADCC - formally born at the Lusaka Summit of April 198O - was conceived in 
decisions of the Front line States over February-July 1979 culminating in the 
Arusha meeting of their senior economic ministers followed by a meeting with
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invited national and international development agencies. Therefore with its 
1985 Summit and 1986 Harare Annual Conference it entered into its second half 
decade of full fledged existence.
Over that period SADCC has grown from a dream of co-ordinated economic 
liberation to a functioning organisation with over 500 priority projects 
within over a dozen sectoral programmes involving resource targets of over 
$5,500 million of which roughly $1,400 million is committed (and perhaps half 
as much already spent) and $1,400 million more under negotiation by the end of 
1985. It has had an impact and acquired a profile greater than that of any 
other African regional economic grouping and played a prominent role in
opreparations for the 1985 0AU Economic Summit and the 1986 UN Special Session 
on Africa
Further, SADCC has become a prominent political economic as well as technico
economic actor in Southern Africa. From 19 81 it has denounced South African
destabilisation and aggression as an economic threat to its members and as a
4set of actions demanding effective international action to counter them. In
1985 its Arusha Summit and in 1986 its Harare Consultative Conference issued
calls for sanctions and in 1986 the Harare Conference Chairman issued the
first major denunciation of the Reagan Administration’s hosting of and
restoration of military aid to Jonas Savimbi and his South African sponsored
and controlled UNITA as an act of destabilisation and aggression in league
5with South Africa. This despite the fact that the USA was - and is - one of 
the SADCC food security and agricultural research sectors' largest financial 
supporters.
Finally, SADCC has resisted the calls for laissez faire as a route to African
economic development.^ It has insisted that dependence and fragmentation were
built in Southern Africa by consistent, sustained state intervention in the
economies and economic processes and that economic liberation and equitable
regional cooordination can only be built by equally consistent and sustained
intervention by the governments of its member States. Partly for this reason
it doubts the centrality of trade promotion - especially via the common market
route - and stresses the importance of coordinating production expansion in
7transport and communication, energy, knowledge, personnel and manufacturing.
i
This is a record which compels attention in several respects. Two of the most
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important are: SADCC as a distinctly non-traditional and African designed
political economic co-ordination process and SADCC as an actor in the struggle 
for between South Africa's total strategy enforced regional hegemony to 
increase the safety and profitability of apartheid by regional economic 
leverage backed by armed force and Southern and South Africans struggle for 
liberation. The latter is particularly topical in 1986 as both the 
oppressiveness and aggressiveness of the Pretoria Regime and the buildup of 
forces favouring at least some serious economic santions against it are 
growing rapidly.
An Alternative Approach: To Regional Co-ordination
The SADCC model is distinctly different from the standard common market one in 
several respects. Its theoretical base is partly a highly adapted economies
g
of scale in expansion of production including production of knowledge model 
and partly an eclectic pragmatism based on the principle of state perception
of common interests believed to be pursued more effectively in common than
gseparately The focus is on production with trade seen as consequential and
instrumental not as a goal in itself.
The SADCC model is straightforwardly interventionist. The Lusaka
Declaration^ quite bluntly outlines how economic dependency on, and political
domination by, South Africa was constructed by intervention not free market
forces and equally bluntly says that economic liberation must be attained in
the same way. When at the Blantyre Annual Conference USAID read a lecture on
freeing the market and unleashing private enterprise, the Chairman firmly
reiterated that the choice of instruments was for SADCC's member States to
decide, not for its cooperating partners (SADCC 19 81; Conference Report 1982 -
USAID and Chairman's Closing Statements). The combination of a production
oriented and an interventionist model have made SADCC very much committed to 
11concrete action.
The institutional model is just as different from the traditional one. The 
central Secretariat is small (indeed until the end of 1982 it was a
responsibility of a member State - Botswana - not a separate institution. It 
has key diplomatic, conference organisational, internal coordination and 
publication, and - when so directed - study production duties, but is clearly 
the creature not the master of the member States. Its proposals can be - and
-in­
frequently are - rejected, replaced by state presented substitutes or 
significantly modified. A weak central secretariat and a commitment to action 
are apparently contradictory. The SADCC resolution of this apparent dilemma 
is to:
1. allocate sectoral (e.g energy, food security, agricultural research, 
transport and communications) coordination to specialist units supervised 
and run by designated member states and expanding (in one case - 
transport and communications - to a fully fledged commission) as agreed 
programmes are put into practice so that programme unit professionals 
number about 100 in contrast with 5 in the central secretariat.
2. devolve project implementation responsibility on the state(s) in which it 
is located.
Both of these approaches are in line with SADCC's determination to see that
member States are fully involved in all stages from concept through proposal
through planning and mobilisation to implementation and review. While
12accepting that this may be cumbersome or slow, SADCC sees it as essential if 
decisions are to be perceived as related to real subsequent action, to have 
member State commitment and understanding behind them and to be acted upon.
Whether the distribution problem has been faced in a novel way or side-stepped
13for later action is less than clear. SADCC is explicitly committed to 
"equitable” regional integration. To date this has been achieved partly by 
having a mix of programmes and projects in each sector seen by all interested 
member States as benefitting them, partly by rigorous economy on overhead 
budgets and partly by raising a very substantial proportion of sectoral as 
well as project costs externally. Some States are not very interested in 
certain sectors. SADCC does not require projects or even programmes to be of 
interest to all members and even at sectoral level serious interest of 6 of 
the 9 members is seen as adequate even though 9 would be preferable. The 
programme and project mix can be maintained; the minimal present cost will 
grow (e.g. as inreasing numbers of sectoral unit staff are both citizens and 
SADCC paid); the heavy external personnel and sectoral unit financial support 
are fairly clearly transitional and, indeed, phasing them down is SADCC policy 
since the 1986 Harare Council of Ministers meeting.
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SADCC has avoided the Christmas Tree approach of an elaborate Treaty with a 
central common market trunk with other sectoral goals hung around it like 
decorative balls or tinsel. Sectors have been rejected. Indeed one may 
suspect that one or two of the present ones would either not have been 
approved or would have been located elsewhere except for the initial 
determination to see that each member State had a sector of real interest to 
itself to coordinate to ensure its full involvement. Probably up to half of 
proposed projects do not reach agreed regional priority lists and after the 
initial surge new projects and programmes are relatively few and usually very 
carefully studied. This degree of prioritisation is surprising as a common 
interest approach lacks the self defined core of the traditional common market 
one. The answer appears to be that SADCC has rigorously tested proposals 
against three principles:
1. would they reduce dependence - especially on South Africa?
2. would they meet a critical regional developmental need not equally well
pursued nationally?
3. did they represent areas of perceived common interest - on ways and means 
as well as goals - among SADCC member States?
For example the long delay in setting up a Trade Sector programme relates to 
agreement on a common interest in principle but linked with moderately serious 
disagreement on ways and means. It is fairly typical of SADCC, however, that
it has kept trying to resolve these (with a series of in-house, regional team
and consultancy studies as inputs into official and ministerial dialogue). If 
- as seems likely - agreement is reached in 19 86-8 7, then implementation will 
be able to proceed because there will be a real common agreement on what is to 
be done, not a papered over chasm.
Whatever else can be said of SADCC's model, it is original and indigenous to 
the region. One might almost say it springs jointly from perceptions of 
present overriding needs and from views on the nature of the failure (or 
inequity) of past integration schemes. SADCC had neither a fairy godmother 
nor a sinister godfather. Two candidates have been floated - the USSR and the 
EEC. Both are clearly risible; the USSR has never taken a serious interest in 
SADCC and a model less similar to the EEC’s would be hard to imagine. If any
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"outside" agency or agencies were to be cited they should be the Government of 
Botswana and the Front Line States but both of these are part and parcel of 
the SADCC «,region. SADCC has used expatriates but it is notable that all 
working on key policy and strategy issues have been individually selected by 
SADCC and were responsible solely to it. It is viewed by its member States as 
very much their creation in which they take pride of authorship and 
responsibility for maintenance and development.
The Concrete Bond
SADCC sectoral programmes now number 13 with over 500 projects for which as of
February 1986 about $1,400 million had been negotiated (and in substantial
part spent) and $1,400 more was under negotiation (up from $1,150 and $1,100
million at the end of July 1985) out of a total cost of the order of
$5,500-6,000 million. In many sectors detailed programmes (including
coordination of traffic flows and regulations and direct interaction among
enterprises including railroads, ports, airlines, post offices and power
corporations) beyond projects were also substantial. Over 1985 SADCC
conducted a series of reviews and established criteria for linked 5 year
14sectoral perspective plans as well as producing a regional Macro-Economic 
15Survey. Taken together this record appears to demonstrate a substantial and 
growing volume of action, an evolution of coordination toward longer time
frames and more sectoral interaction and an intensive - and fairly open - self 
evaluation exercise.
The results managerially and procedurally include:
1. intense state involvement in planning, programming and implementation; 
with
2. uneven progress by sector depending in part on the energy and capacity of 
the coordinating state and its unit;
3. a distinct overburdening of technical units and the Secretariat with
meeting demands related to concrete action to which are now added those
of formulaating five year coordinated sectoral plans;
4. a real sense of common purpose backed by substantial numbers of personal
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contacts (from officials through Heads of State at least 1,000 people 
have participated in operational SADCC meetings); but
5. also a concern that, while progress is being won, greater speed and 
efficiency is required given the tasks confronting SADCC in meeting the 
goals set for it and the burdens laid upon it by its member States.
Communications among productive enterprises have been weak. This may reflect 
SADCC's preoccupation with other requirements which clearly had to be carried 
out by governments or a belief that the coordination frame it is creating will 
create a climate of opinion (including member State opinion in respect to the 
enterprises they own) which will result in increased enterprise links. 
However, - with the partial exception of Zimbabwe and Malawi - domestic 
manufacturing and external trading enterprises (public or private) are not now 
oriented to seeking regional sources or markets - let alone regional 
technology or management partners. Thus - ironically - SADCC's attitude to 
enterprise level coordination and regional economic link building at that 
level may to date be too laissez faire.
SADCC And External Finance; Managing The Transfer Process
SADCC has always seen external cooperation (its standard terminology avoids
the use of the terms donor and aid) as important both for securing
understanding and support and for mobilising finance. This is typified by the
designation of the Annual Conference with co-operating partners in the Lusaka 
16Declaration. In itself that may not be particularly unusual. However its 
managment of the process is virtually unique.
The Annual Conference is distinctive both as to format and as to style. To 
treat the format first:
1. the Conference is organised and invitations issued wholly by SADCC;
2. all documentation (and it is recognised by the external partners as of 
high quality) is prepared by the SADCC coordinating units and 
secretariat;
3. the main opening and closing session speakers are chosen by SADCC;
4. substantial time is provided for dialogue on sectors going well beyond 
"pledging" and involving two way exchanges of ideas and criticisms as 
well as some discussion on development themes broader than SADCC. For 
example, the Nordic states have instituted the tradition of a Nordic 
paper each year on some broad theme they consider relevant, e.g. 
Agricultural Policy (especially price policy) in 1984 and Employment in 
1986.
5. the Conference Communique (approved by all participating governments and 
international organisations) is drafted by the Conference Chairman 
(SADCC's Ministerial Level Chairman who has throughout been the Vice 
President of Botswana) not by a committee of 'donors' and 'recipients'.
This format does affect the tone of the conference which, unlike the typical 
donor group, is on an agenda SADCC chooses and also presents on its own terms 
with the cooperating partners responding. Over time the Conference - despite 
the obligatory time for the invited delegations to speak - has become less and 
less a pledging circus and more a forum for reflecting on, reaffirming and 
exploring next steps in cooperation.
SADCC has also chosen to develop a distinctive style of presentation to the 
Conferences:
1 . extensive sectoral documentation on overall sectoral goals, programmes 
and results (including old project status) as well as new or represented 
projects for finance;
2. an Overview which (together with the Chairman's initial Statement) 
highlights key issues beyond sectors and projects as SADCC sees them;
3 . a businesslike tone concentrating on making concrete progress with very 
little rhetoric and a good deal both of frankness and of friendliness;
4 . combined with toughness on perceived threats - e.g. discriminatory aid 
which excluded certain named states and more persistently South African 
aggression and economic destabilisation.
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The last point is illustrative. SADCC has achieved an image of competent
economic action orientation. Therefore, it has been able to make itself heard
when it says that as an economic organisation it cannot overlook economic
destabilisation, sabotage and aggression which undermine its member States’
economies and (literally) destroy key projects and that its cooperating
partners have a duty to cooperate on this problem as well as that of 
17finance. When the topic of South African economic aggression was first 
raised at the Blantyre SADCC it was controversial and three states and one 
international organisation sought to have it deleted from the Communique. It 
is now an accepted Overview, Conference and Communique topic even if one which 
still makes certain governments somewhat uneasy.
Substantively SADCC has managed (in both senses) several innovations in
resource flows:
1. in 1980 when renovation and rehabilitation funding was rarely acceptable 
(as opposed to being fashionable as it has since become) SADCC carefully 
packaged regional transport rehabilitation programmes as standard 
projects and won acceptance of many of them (so much so it was later
criticised for not stressing rehabilitation!);
182. in the Lusaka Declaration , the priority of drought resistant crop
research oriented to poor peasants was laid down and negotiated
tenaciously for five years until it came into operation (again the
fashionability of the field rose but partly because of SADCC's posing
it);
3 . food security was developed into an articulated, programmed area which 
attracted funds inter alia leading to the first national/regional
coordinated early warning system in Africa coming into operation over
1986/87. Interestingly, food security was in fact not on SADCC's
priority list prior to the 1979 Arusha exploratory conference with
cooperating partners to be. It was suggested by them and accepted by
SADCC, subject to being able to design plausible regional projects (on
which the suggestors had few concrete ideas). The ready acceptance lends 
credence to SADCC's genuine willingness to listen and the articulation 
(begun by the 19 8O Maputo Conference and fairly fully done a year later) 
to its innovative capacity.
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As noted, finance mobilised or under negotiation as of February 1986 was of 
the order of $2,800 million. Even accepting that by no means all was
additional, the 80$ of that amount which is foreign demonstrates that SADCC 
has come to be viewed as a viable channel for routing support with a
project/programme list of above average quality.
Clearly SADCC has not managed (in either sense) to end the influence of
funding agencies on projects and programmes: what they do not fund is unlikely
to be done. On the other hand the mobilisation process has been so managed as
1Qto win several significant gains
1. choice by funders is from a regionally agreed SADCC list (offers of
projects not on the list are unwelcome and, in practice, not made);
2. SADCC states have held together on their priorites and not allowed donors
to manipulate them to change project or (with one or two borderline
exceptions) their locations;
3. the attempt to discriminate by excluding states from benefits accruing to
funding a major project was so managed that the would-be funder - USAID -
restated its conditions in terms of what it would support, additional
20funding was secured and both the project and regional unity survived;
4. SADCC has evolved means to focus funding on key sub-sectoral project
groups, e.g. the 1983 Dar Harbour, 1985 Tazara and 1986 Beira Port and 
Port Corridor Conferences (serviced by the Southern African Transport and 
Communications Commission) have broken bottlenecks caused by funding gaps 
that did threaten cohesiveness of programme implementation.
In 1986 SADCC entered into two new agreements. The one, a "Memorandum of
21Understanding On Programming of Lome III Regional Funds" was the first case
in which the EEC agreed a set of principles, guidelines and allocation
patterns for the use of Lome Convention Regional Funds with an ACP Regional
Organisation. The second, a "Joint Declaration On Expanded Economic And
Cultural Cooperation Between The Nordic Countries And the SADCC Member States"
22(together with a "Memorandum" on ways toward programme development) set out 
to lay the foundation for region to region cooperation beyond aid including
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agreed development and South-North economic relations principles and on trade 
(including SADCC exports to the Nordic region) and investment.
In fact external resource mobilisation management has become more important 
and more distinctive than SADCC’s founders anticipated or wished:
1. SADCC initially underestimated the scale of the agreed regional
programmes (and thus the funding needed);
2. and - like most other forecasters - did not expect the 1980 world 
recession to endure through 1983 and be followed by so weak a recovery; 
nor
3. the explosive rise of South African aggression which over 1980-84 cost
23SADCC states on the order of at least $10,000 million and probably
about 13,000 for that period and nearly $25,000 million over 1975-85 with
24the 1986 bill likely to be of the order of $5,000 million.
As the second and third points reduced domestic resources available, the only
way SADCC could advance was to raise more foreign. In fact as a new vehicle,
with a respectable set of proposals largely for major, import intensive 
projects (the type usually suitable for regional rather than national 
prioritisation) SADCC proved very effective at this - which doubtless 
increased member State commitment to and enthusiasm for its priority 
coordination process.
One problem as of 1986 is arguably a result of success at external fund 
raising - an 80$ or more ratio of external funding to total funding is too 
high. Managing resource mobilisation with such a high proportion of external 
funds is always difficult and even more so when a main goal is to keep overall 
control of the process in African state hands.
SADCC’s main channels of relations with external financial sources are not 
well adapted to raising funds from or for enterprises. Exploration of fora 
more suited to that role has begun in the industrial sector - with an initial 
conference including TNCs on the external side and domestic companies within 
SADCC member State delegations held in Harare in 1984 and another scheduled 
for Lusaka in 1 98 6/ 8 7 - and are envisaged in the Nordic Agreement. Much of
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the transport funding is for national corporations (bi-national in the Tazara 
railway case) serving more than one state as is some in respect to the 
electricity subsector but this is within the old coordinated public utility 
ambit of earlier African cooperation groupings and standard government to 
government lending for infrastructural corporations, not a true innovation.
Some Comparisons
The comparison of the traditional and SADCC approaches to economic regionalism 
(or sub-regionalism in ECA terminology) strongly suggests the differences do 
matter. SADCC's operational and development managerial process is distinctly 
different and - while far from perfect - appears much closer to normally 
endorsed management tests and techniques.
Certain aspects of SADCC's operational style are adaptable to other forms of
economic regionalism. The most evident is full governmental involvement and
decentralisation of programming to place power squarely in member government
hands and to create direct government/programme links for each member State.
This has been fairly regularly commended by SADCC Conference Communiques
endorsed by external partners and also in partners’ statements (SADCC
Conference Reports). More important, it was also endorsed by the OAU 1985
26Addis Ababa Summit which commended it to other African regional 
organisations as an innovation to adopt. A logical consequence of such action 
would be to focus attention on how to resolve the present conflict in 
traditional regional bodies between economic policies which are dirigiste 
laissez faire at regional level; in the sense that the steps toward, and 
timetables for, approaching a common market often appear to bear little 
relation to structural and institutional patterns or existing market relations 
and to be imposed from above at least as arbitrarily as any other type of 
economic intervention and thus conflict with interventionism at national 
levels because once fully involved in an organisation's preparatory work and 
project selection, process states will presumably see the conflict more 
clearly and attempt to resolve it.
Why SADCC has performed better on managerial tests is not entirely clear 
albeit part of the reasons - as discussed above - would seem to flow from its 
substantive model of political economic integration and from the fact that it 
was the creation of its member governments. Another factor may be an above
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normal interest in management and evaluation. One of the relatively rare
27studies on management of economic regionalism in Africa was done for SADCC. 
Similarly in 1984-85 SADCC carried out a thoroughgoing review of procedures as
well as substance including getting the opinions of external partners and
28member states on the basis of which it reported to member States to the OAU
as well as drawing up guidelines for sectoral management and perspective 
29planning which did influence the process and content of almost all of the 
sectoral documentation and presentations at Harare.
SADCC's connceptualisation of development is also clearer - at least to the 
lay person - than that of most other regional economic organisations. It is 
directed to coordinated enhancement of production (including transport and 
communications, training and knowledge); increasing oportunities for higher 
productivity by the peasant farmer and enhancing food security; meeting the 
basic needs of the peoples of its member states; reducing external dependence, 
especially on South Africa. All of these are concepts which are widely 
understandable. Further, the majority of the programmes and projects can be 
seen to be related to them. Drought resistant staple grain research oriented 
to peasants has a clear link to basic needs, peasant incomes, food security. 
Rebuilding and protecting rail, road and pipeline links to Maputo, Beira, 
Nacala and Dar es Salaam can be seen to be relevant to reducing dependence on
South Africa. This point is reinforced by South Africa's frenzied efforts to
keep these lines closed or limping and to divert traffic from them to its own. 
SADCC and RSA are equally convinced that the key to the former's economic
liberation from the latter's regional economic hegemony is transport. So can 
building an international airport in Lesotho and earth satellite stations 
bypassing the Johannesburg external telecommunications hub.
Whether SADCC has managed to communicate to its potential audiences is a
question whose answer depends partly on "to whom?" It does produce public 
Annual Progress Reports, Overviews, Sectoral Documentation and, now, Regional 
Macro-Economic Surveys^0 and has published an informative but fairly simple 
handbook.
SADCC's internal communications are intelligible to those directly involved, 
e.g. Southern African Centre for Coordination of Agricultural Research 
(SACCAR) work is understandable to agricultural researchers, extension 
managers and - perhaps less uniformly - ministerial officials. Member States
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and external cooperating partners perceive themselves as well informed.
Press relations and those with researchers are more problematic. However 
SADCC pays more attention to the press - and gets more informed coverage - 
than is usual for African regional organisations or the economic programme 
sections of African governments. A somewhat analagous situation exists in 
respect to researchers. That SADCC is concerned is shown by the fact that one 
of its few new secretariat posts is for a press and publicity officer who 
inter alia is to write simple language features and liaise with member State 
press agencies on their distribution. A first set of such features and/or 
background material for them was distributed in March 1985 on the occasion of 
the April 1985 Fifth Anniversary of the Founding Summit and Lusaka 
Declaration.
Whether this reaches the women with the jembe or the market basket or the man 
with the axe or at the desk is another matter. Except when specific projects 
are seen as part of the SADCC regional priority Programme of Action, probably 
not. That is a weakness it shares with national economic development 
management.
In respect to enterprises the most that can be said is that no false moves 
have been made, a few tentative initiatives begun and a climate favourable for 
inter-enterprise expansion of regional links created. What SADCC initiatives 
are needed - beyond transport and electricity is unclear. In general neither 
public nor private sector multi-state ownership is likely to prove widely 
satisfactory and multi-state operations (other than intra-regional trade) by 
enterprises based in one state - while existing to a limited extent and 
offering possibilities for some expansion - is unlikely to be an adequate 
modality by itself. Multi-national endeavours encompassing sourcing, 
marketing, technology and management arrangements going beyond normal arms’ 
length commercial transactions may hold out more promise. Since many of the 
enterprises in question are public sector, state action to encourage exploring 
such possibilities is likely to prove crucial. Expanded trade is likely to 
need regionally or nationally based trading firms with regional knowledge and 
orientation and a perception that import sources are as critical as export 
markets to harmonious trade growth in a context of largely incovertible 
currencies. In several states these are likely to be state owned or joint 
ventures so that again government innovatory thinking is needed. However, the
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most important single requirement for SADCC in respect to enterprise 
cooperation in regional development may be to build up more substantive and 
closer channels of communication with domestic enterprises and enterprise 
groupings such as Chambers of Commerce.
The lesson to be learned is clearly not that SADCC's approach is perfect. One 
of the strengths of SADCC - critical self evaluation - would lead it to be 
among the first to reject any such accolade. Rather they may be:
1. having a clear, self defined strategic perspective is crucial to making 
significant progress;
2. innovation in structure, programming and management matters;
3. programmes, external relations and management need to be related to goal 
and structural characteristics;
4. reflection on and improvement of results should be a built-in part of the 
regional operational and management process;
5. presentation of political economic goals in developmental terms relating 
to people and their communication to - at the least - broader audiences 
than usually receive them now is perfectly possible and is based on sound 
technical, professional and mangerial work not public relations gimmicks.
Other Regional Organisations
Eastern and Southern Africa have three other regional organisations: the
Preferential Trade Area for East and Southern Africa (potentially Ethiopia to 
Lesotho and Mauritius to Angola in coverage albeit Angola, Mozambique, 
Botswana, the Seychelles and Madagascar have not joined while Tanzania has 
joined but has not in fact activated the preferential trade provisions 
provided for in the Treaty); the Kagera Basin Authority 
(Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi-Tanzania) and the project for recreating East African 
(Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania) patterns of cooperation. None has been as much in the 
news in 1985-86 as SADCC or as they themselves have been in previous years.^
In the case of the Kagera Basin Authority and the attempt to reconstruct in
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East Africa, the lull has clearly been dominated by the total incoherence of
the Ugandan government until the accession to power of President Yoweri
Museveni’s council and cabinet in early 1986 and by their need to concentrate
on making a new start domestically since. The Kagera group has centred partly
on joint river basin development and partly on developing the access routes of
the landlocked trio of members to the Indian Ocean via Dar es Salaam. Work on
the road connections between Rwanda and Tanzania and lake links between Uganda
and Burundi and Tanzania has continued to move ahead.^ The East African
project has made virtually no visible progress. First it is still largely at
a conceptual and parameter dialogue state and thus cannot be pursued without
the active interest of and substantial senior offical and political time
inputs by all three states. Ugnada cannot devote this time while Tanzania is
far more concerned with SADCC and national economic rehabilitation-^ than with
major new initiatives at East African level. Second, Kenya and Tanzania take
divergent views on what form trade expansion should take. Kenya - reasonably
enough if its goal is maximum net exports to Tanzania - wishes to use PTA
preferences and Clearing House arrangements as the main way forward. Tanzania
34- with a long experience of trade deficits with Kenya - wants a more 
interventionist format in which export expansion by one party would be 
contingent on its buying more from the other. This certainly serves 
Tanzania’s interests but it is also rather better oriented to sustainable and 
mutually beneficial trade increases than the more laissez faire approach.
The PTA is in practice a secretariat led free trade oriented standard economic
integration grouping. It has created preferential tariff rates on 312 items,
opened a Clearing House for setlement of intra state payments, resolved to
establish a trade promotion bank and adopted a host of programme or project
resolutions in respect to sectors other thaan trade while expanding its
35membership to 15 of 20 elegible states. On the face of it a commendable
record - especially when the somewhat similar Economic Community of West 
Africa has managed to complete its first decade without implementing any 
tariff preferences at all and having at most half a dozen small projects using 
its development fund.
But on closer inspection the results look less impressive. Intra PTA trade is 
under 5% of members’ total external trade and not growing. Further it is 
dominated by Kenyan exports to its neighbours and Zambia and by Zimbabwe's 
somewhat less unbalanced trade with its PTA member neighbours (albeit
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non-member Botswana is a larger two-way trading partner). Neither the 
patterns nor the levels seem markedly affected by the PTA. Similarly less 
than 10% of intra-PTA payments are in fact cleared through the clearing house. 
While approved it is a trifle hard to see how the trade bank is going to be 
financed. Finally, the sectoral programmes - prepared by the Secretariat and 
ratified by the members - do not, for whatever reason, appear to represent 
serious commitments to member States so that few, if any, are operational.
Two interesting developments did take place in the first half of 1986. The 
first was a workshop on countertrade held in Nairobi. Its mere convening 
represented a sharp shift from the PTA's earlier root and branch condemnation 
of such an approach and the general tone of the meetings was apparently in 
favour of exploring potential for balanced two-way trade expansion 
arrangements.^
The second was the relaxation of the rules restricting access to preferences
to firms with domestic majorities in beneficial ownership and top
37management. Both of the two main PTA exporters - Kenya and Zimbabwe (and 
presumably the number three exporter, Malawi as well) were seriously
constrained by this rule because many of their large export oriented firms
were foreign subsidiaries or joint ventures which would not qualify after the 
transitional period. While Zimbabwe hoped to use the rule to pressure foreign 
firms to reduce their stake in Zimbabwe enterprises to below 50$, this
apparently did not happen on a large scale. The new rule gives 100$ of
preferences if domestic ownership is 51$ or more and 60$ and 30$ of full
preferences to those with 41 to 50$ and 31 to 40$ local ownership
respectively.
South Africa’s Total Strategy
Put simply, South Africa’s total strategy for Southern Africa is to make theOQ
region safe and profitable for apartheid. To do so it uses economic
dependence links, economic sanctions (most notably against Lesotho in January
1986 albeit these led to the ’wrong’ new government from Pretoria’s point of
39view - a reigning King who endorses sanctions and denounces both apartheid 
and aggression from a broad popular base, is not the neo-Bantustan figure 
South Africa hoped to install), economic destabilisation by interfering with 
trade and/or transport flows through economic means and armed aggression
T a b le  1
Trade
Main partner
Exports to South Africa
Imports from South Africa
Migrant workers 
Number
% of wage labour force 
Remittances
Tourism
No. of South African 
tourists
% of total
South Africa supplies 
Electricity 
Oil 
Food
Overseas trade via 
South Africa
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA
Botswana Lesotho Swaziland Malawi Mozambique Zimbabwe
South Africa 
£36m (17/0 
£393m (88%)
South Africa 
negligible 
£286m (9536)
South Africa 
$42m (2036) 
£286m (9056)
South Africa 
£9m ( 636) 
£64m (3636)
South Africa 
£9m (536) 
£59m (1456)
South Africa 
£76m ( 1 756) 
£130m (2236)
29,169 150,422 13,418 30,603 59,391 16,965
2336 8636 1536 856 2056 2%
PO 1m
150,000 over 50,000 50,000 25,000 negligible 63,000
6736 7036 6036 39% - 2436
1956 10036 5036 - one-third
10036 10036 10036 7036 some some
most most some some some some
9556 all one-third some - two-thirds
Zambia
Britain 
£3m (136) 
£64m ( 1 656 )
banned
some
one-third
Source: Third World Affairs 1985
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(directly or via proxies such as the MNR in Mozambique, the LLA in Lesotho, 
super-ZANU in Zimbabwe and UNITA in Angola^0) both to create general economic 
disruption and to knock out regional transport links which threaten South 
African hegemony.
The degree of some aspects of dependence is shown by the following table:
Table 1
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA
Trade
Main partner
Exports to South Africa
Imports from South Africa
Botswana
South Africa 
£36m (17?) 
£393m (88?)
Lesotho
South Africa 
negligible 
£286m (95?)
Swaziland
South Africa 
$42m (20?) 
£286m (90?)
Malawi
South Africa 
£9m (6?) 
£64m (36?)
Tourism
No. of South African 
tourists
? of total
South Africa supplies 
Electricity 
Oil 
Food
150,000
67?
19?
100?
most
over 50,000 
70?
100?
100?
most
50,000
60?
50?
100?
some
25,000
39?
70?
some
Mozambique
South Africa 
£9m (5?) 
£59m (14?)
Migrant workers
Number 29,169 150,422 13,418 30,603 59,391
? of wage labour force 23? 86? 15? 8? 20?
Remittances £21m £99m £9m £11m £43m
negligible
one-third
some
some
Zimbabwe
South Africa 
£76m (17?) 
£130m (22 ?)
16,965
2?
£20m
63,000
24?
1?
some
some
Zambia
Britain 
£3m (1?) 
£64m (16?)
banned
Overseas trade via 
South Africa 95? all one-third two-thirds one-third
Source: Third World Affairs 1985
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While highly summarised it does demonstrate the great leverage South Africa
has. On this base the Pretoria regime had hoped to erect its own regional
grouping or "Constellation of States". The election of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe
in Zimbabwe and the founding of SADCC in early 1980 effectively killed the 
41Constellation - which South Africa has neither forgotten nor forgiven.
Since SADCC has proven to be cohesive and functional, South Africa perceives
it - and especially its economically sound and technically feasible transport
delinking programme - as a dangerous enemy. The result has been summed up by 
42President Machel:
We are aware that the fundamental aim of the actions of 
destabilisation against our countries is to render SADCC 
non-viable... ports and railways, fuel depots and pipelines, 
bridges and roads, communications sytems and other development 
projects are the targets...
Unfortunately no one can claim that economic sanctions - broadly defined to 
include aggression - by South Africa against SADCC have not been effective in 
terms of costs imposed. They have proven very costly indeed to the 
independent states of the region.
4RSADCC's estimate of the cost of South African aggression is detailed in 
Table 2, with adjusted figures in brackets. The direct cost of war damage has 
been calculated from Angolan and Mozambican official data, as have the relief 
and refugee costs. The extra defence expenditure is estimated by country - 
excluding Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania for which it probably totals at 
least $250 million - by comparing defence budget levels and increases with 
probable spending in a more peaceful setting.
«
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Table 2
The Price of Defying Pretoria; SADCC States Bill 1980-84
SADCC Estimate Revised Estimate
Direct War Damage 1 610 000 000
Extra defence expenditure 3 060 000 000 (3 310 000 000)
Higher transport, energy costs 970 000 000
Smuggling, (looting) 190 000 000
Ref ugees 660 000 000
Loss exports, tourism 230 000 000 (250 000 000)
Boycotts, embargoes 260 000 000
Loss of existing production 800 000 000
Lost economic growth 2 000 000 000 (4 000 000 000)
Trading arrangements (plus
•fighting1 transport rates,
export credits) 340 000 000 (590 000 000)
10 120 000 000 (12 940 000 000)
Smuggling and looting by South African and proxy forces centres on diamonds, 
ivory, timber and semi-precious stones from Angola and Mozambique. Lost 
exports and tourism revenue is calculated on the basis of Mozambican coal and 
sugar, Angolan non-oil exports, Malawian and Swazi sugar, and Mozambican 
tourism. This is certainly an underestimate as Zimbabwean steel and 
agricultural exports have also been affected.
Higher transport and energy costs, and lost revenue from geographically and 
financially artificial routing via South Africa have been estimated from SATS' 
revenue on regional transit traffic and higher costs to Malawi on non-SATS 
routes, such as the road via Zambia and Zimbabwe, air and road/rail via 
Tanzania. Boycotts and embargo costs, as estimated, are dominated by the loss 
of Mozambican revenue on South African cargo diverted from Maputo. Other 
items relate to disruption of trade from the seven southern SADCC countries.
Loss of production is necessarily highly approximate. Partial official data 
from Angola and Mozambique suggest $650 million for these countries. SADCC 
estimates for Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi appear low, offsetting any double 
counting with lost exports or transport revenue.
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If these figures are extended backward to 1975 and forward through 1985 the 
decade cost is of the order of $25,000 million. The annual cost is now of the 
order of at least $5,000 million.^ These figures far exceed the SADCC 
regions's total inflows of external finance and are in excess of ' \0% of total 
regional output. For Angola the cost is probably of the order of half of 
non-petroleum sector GDP and for Mozambique up to two-thirds of what output 
could be in a peaceful context.
SADCC's Response
South Africa has imposed costs on SADCC's members. It has not succeeded 
either in breaking or nullifying SADCC or in making the Constellation seem an 
attractive alternative. The dream of regional economic liberation which the 
regional total strategy was intended to kill lives on and is pursued by SADCC 
at least as determinedly as in 1980.
SADCC - with sabotage or destabilisation calling cards delivered by South 
Africa immediately preceeding all its post 1980 Annual Conferences - has 
clearly defined apartheid, not economic liberation by peaceable construction 
of new projects, enterprises and institutions as the cause of regional war. 
It has been united in its determination to find ways and means to push ahead 
- including (albeit not under SADCC's own auspices) joint security and 
training arrangements among Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania which have 
cleared the Beira port corridor and the Malawi-Harare road link and begun to 
raise the combat capacity of the Mozambican army. On this there has been 
complete solidarity as to the need to take South Africa's desparate - and all 
too successful - attempts to block intra-SADCC routes to the sea as 
endorsement of SADCC's identification of transport as the keystone in South 
Africa's overarching regional hegemony. SADCC has kept building - and its 
external co-operating partners have not been scared off by the very real 
danger of South Africa or its proxies blowing up the projects they help 
finance (at Maseru in 1983 hours before the Danish Foreign Minister came to 
open - or in the event pledge to repair - it).
Similarly, SADCC has answered the buildup of aggression by building up both 
its spotlighting of the 'problem' and its calls for effective international 
action to force South Africa to halt its aggression. By 1986 Chairman Mmusi
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explicitly called for sanctions likening their cost to the region to the pains 
of a woman in labour. As a SADCC official put it, the present situation is 
the much less fruitful and never ending pain of being beaten over the head 
daily by a thug wielding a sjambok.
SADCC On Sanctions
SADCC as a creation and a creature of its member States cannot and does not 
have a position different from them. However, as a channel, a forum and a 
coordinating process SADCC has become more than the least common denominator 
of its member States.
By mid-1985 six SADCC member States (the six Front Line States) were firmly on
record as advocates of sanctions against South Africa. None saw international
sanctions as sufficient conditions by themselves but as interacting with and
complementing the actions of Liberation Movements and the independent states
in order to minimise the time, economic cost and - especially - human
suffering and loss of life required. Lesotho had also - in only slightly
nuanced language - endorsed sanctions, an act of great courage on King
Moshoeshoe’s part given his country's geographic, economic and strategic 
46context. It had in addition made the most forceful presentation of the case 
that sanctions should not be allowed to crush the neighbours and opponents of 
apartheid. Zimbabwe had earlier outlined why South Africa's neighbours could 
not be expected to introduce sanctions first nor as fully and fast as other 
states.
SADCC views the present costs of destabilisation and economic aggression by 
South Africa against its member States and their regional economic liberation 
project as intolerable. SADCC takes South Africa's threat to retaliate 
seriously - as President Quett Masire of Botswana said early in 19 8 6, South 
African promises are rarely to be taken seriously but her threats always are.
It does not suppose sanctions would be costless to it nor that they would
produce immediate results in/on RSA. It sees the logical response to 
sanctions as including speeding up SADCC priority programmes and projects 
desirable in their own right and therefore yielding lasting benefits as well 
as entailing present costs.
The costs would be considerable. How high they would be and what offsetting
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gains would result depends very much on how comprehenive sanctions were,
whether SADCC countries imposed them in full at once or on a phased (or
partial basis) and above all whether SADCC and its member States had carried
out the pre-planning and acquired the resources to carry out a speed-up of
47economic liberation.
The key problems would include resourcing and rerouting petroleum imports, 
constructing links between national power grids (regionally and among 
Swaziland-Mozambique-Zimbabwe-Zambia-Boswana there is surplus generating 
capacity) and resourcing imports from low cost global sources to replace South 
African. The last requires setting up independent (of South Africa) 
import/export houses with global knowledge and customs collection systems 
independent of South Africa. On the export side the key challenge would be 
creating meaningful employment or self employment for perhaps 300,000 workers 
expelled by South Africa and the secondary one building up intra-SADCC trade.
However, the key to cost containment and benefit attainment would be 
rehabilitation of transport links. That requires keeping the Beira-Zimbabwe, 
Dar es Salaam-Zambia and Malawi and Maputo-Swaziland corridors functioning and 
upgrading their capacity and, if at all possible, reopening the Nacala-Malawi 
and Maputo-Zimbabwe corridors.
Lesotho - which is not only landlocked but also South Africa locked and which 
economically is analagous to a long distance dormitory suburb for the South 
African Rand - would face especially severe challenges. These would relate to 
job creation, remittance replacement and transport (probably including an 
airlift). Their cost is totally disproportionate to Lesotho's own means and, 
unlike most of the other solutions, does not represent a speeding up of 
SADCC's existing programme so much as temporary special measures.
Realistically, the foregoing programme would require a buildup of SADCC member 
State security forces to protect key projects from South African retaliation 
and of multi-state cooperative campaigns like that being waged by Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique.
48One estimate of the total costs of such a programme over the first three 
years of sanctions is of the order of $6,000 to $6,500 million. However, a 
number of savings and gains could be achieved on import costs, additional
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intra and extra regional exports (replacing South African), lessened transport 
costs, the output of returned workers and increase in production made 
possible by increased security. Over the three year period these might total 
$2,500 to $3,000 million.
However, by the third year the gains could well be of the order of $1,000 to 
$1,500 million versus recurrent costs of $850 million and capital investment 
requirements of $1,150 to $1,400 million. By that point recurrent gains would 
exceed recurrent costs and thereafter gains would continue to rise while costs 
could be static or falling. In short, sanctions - if offsetting measures can 
be taken - could speed up economic liberation and provide lasting gains to 
SADCC member States as well as hastening the end of apartheid, and regional 
aggression to preserve it.
What Is SADCC Doing?
SADCC is well aware of the need to contain costs and attain gains when and if 
effective full scale sanctions are imposed against South Africa. It is also 
aware of the problematic nature of many of the projections. From the 1985 
Arusha Summit on, SADCC has begun work on contingency planning and its 
pre-sanctions implementation. Details are - appropriately - secret but 
several elements and directions have been made public by SADCC.
First, a SADCC member State subcommittee to prepare an overall strategy for 
SADCC responses to sanctions against South Africa has held several meetings.
Second, background papers have been prepared and specific topical 
consultancies commissioned.
Third, a comprehensive draft sanctions response project is to be presented to 
the 1986 Luanda SADCC Summit. While the anatomy of areas of vulnerability to 
costs and opportunities for gains (and especially the cost and benefit 
estimates) present here are those of the present author many are known to 
figure on SADCC’s own list.
Fifth, SADCC is giving priority attention to transport routes allowing 
delinking from South Africa and to providing security for them, to petroleum 
and electricity questions and to developing institutional alternatives to
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South African firms in the import/export and clearing and forwarding sectors. 
Similarly Lesotho’s requirements as a special case have received attention at 
the SADCC Summit and the 1986 Harare Annual Consultative Conference (including 
reference to an airlift).
Sixth, the 1985-86 emphasis on the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport corridors 
is in effect selective speeding up of the two project groups which are most 
crucial for making cost containment and benefit attainment possible.
Seventh, while security is not a SADCC sector, the member States have begun 
actions to upgrade key economic unit security. The most evident are the joint 
Mozambican-Zimbabwean operations which have secured the Beira corridor, 
reopened the Malawi-Zimbabwe highway, and - less securely - allowed restarting 
of upgrading/rehabilitation of the Nacala rail line.
SADCC has moved rapidly to act on its new perception that sanctions against 
South Africa are becoming a real possibility. Its attention is now focused on 
cost containment via speeding up of key elements of SADCC's Lusaka Programme 
of Action. By definition that approach to cost containment can be expected to 
lead to benefit attainment. Its view is that stated by Prime Minister Mugabe 
in June 1986 "We are already suffering? How much more can we suffer? We 
support sanctions because they will shorten the time that we must suffer".
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